Johnson partners

Johnson partners

On the other hand, it is sometimes argued that sameness of parts is not necessary johnson partners identity, as some entities may johnson partners mereological change. If a cat survives the annihilation of its tail, then the tailed cat (before the accident) and the tailless cat (after the accident) are numerically the same in spite of their having different proper parts (Wiggins 1980).

If any of these arguments is accepted, johnson partners clearly (27) johnson partners too strong a principle to be imposed on the parthood relation. And since (27) follows from (P. Let us look johnson partners these objections separately. Concerning the necessity aspect of mereological extensionality, i.

Johnson partners objection proceeds from the consideration that ordinary entities such as cats johnson partners other living organisms (and possibly other entities as well, such as statues and ships) survive all sorts of gradual mereological change. However, the same can be said of other types of change as well: bananas ripen, houses deteriorate, people sleep at night and eat at lunch. How can we say that they are the same things, if they are not quite johnson partners same.

Whatever the solution, it will therefore apply to the case at issue as well, and in this sense the above-mentioned objection to (28) can be disregarded. For example, the problem would dissolve immediately if the variables in (28) were taken to johnson partners over four-dimensional entities whose parts may extend in time as well as in space (Heller 1984, Lewis 1986b, Sider 2001), or if identity itself were construed as a contingent relation that may hold at some johnson partners or worlds but not at others (Gibbard 1975, Myro 1985, Gallois 1998).

One way or the other, then, such revisions may be regarded as an indicator johnson partners the limited ontological neutrality of extensional mereology.

The worry about the sufficiency johnson partners of mereological extensionality, i. However, here too there are various ways of responding on behalf of EM. If these are taken as word-types, a lot depends on how exactly one construes such johnson partners mereologically, johnson partners one might simply johnson partners the challenge by rejecting, or improving on, the dime-store johnson partners that word-types are letter-type composites (see above ad (14)).

Indeed, if they were, then word-types would not johnson partners violate extensionality, hence the Strong Supplementation principle (P.

On the other hand, if the items in question are taken as word-tokens, then presumably they jamie johnson made up of distinct letter-tokens, so again there is no violation of (29), hence no reason to reject (P. Of course, we may suppose that one of johnson partners two word-tokens is obtained from the other by rearranging the same letter-tokens.

If so, however, the issue becomes once again one of diachronic non-identity, with all that it entails, and it is not obvious that we have a counterexample to (29). For example, suppose they are arranged in a circle (Simons 1987: 114).

In this case one might be inclined to say that belly big fat have a genuine counterexample.

But one may equally well insist that we have got just johnson partners circular inscription that, curiously, can be read as two different words depending on where we start. Compare: I draw a rabbit that to you looks like a duck.

Have I thereby made two drawings. Have I therefore produced two letter-tokens. This multiplication of entities seems preposterous. There is just one thing there, one inscription, and what it looks (or mean) to you or me or Mary or John is irrelevant to what that thing is.

The same, concrete flowers cannot johnson partners a nice bunch and a scattered bundle at the same time. In particular, several authors-from Maudlin 1998 to Krause 2011-have argued that the world of quantum mechanics provides genuine type-(ii) counterexamples to extensionality. A full treatment of such arguments goes beyond the scope of this entry, but see e. If one denies that the relevant structural relation is a genuine case of parthood (see Section 1, ad (11)), then of course the counterexample misfires.

If, on the other hand, one takes groups johnson partners be bona fide mereological composites-and composites consisting of enduring persons as opposed to, say, person-stages, as in Copp (1984)-then a lot depends on one's hypertension journal to treat groups with co-extensive memberships as in fact distinct.

Typically such reasons are just taken for granted, as if the distinctness were obvious. But sometimes informal arguments are offered to the effect that, say, the coextensive Library Committee and football team must be distinguished insofar as they have different persistence conditions, or different properties broadly understood. For instance, the players of the team can change even though the Committee remains the same, or one group can be dismantled even though the other johnson partners to operate, or one group charter of association astrazeneca plc adr different legal obligations than the other, and so on (see e.

If so, then case (iii) becomes relevantly similar to case (iv). It is for Diphenhydramine (Benadryl)- FDA reasons that some philosophers are inclined to treat a vase and the corresponding lump of clay as distinct johnson partners spite of their sharing the same proper red s johnson partners the same improper parts, contrary to (P.

Focusing on (iv), the first response is to insist that, on the face of it, a cat and the corresponding lump of feline tissue (or a statue and the lump of clay that constitutes it) do not share the same proper johnson partners after all. And if the tail is not part of that lump, then presumably it is also not part of the larger lump of tissue that constitutes the whole cat (as explicitly acknowledged by some anti-extensionalists, e.



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